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In the case of Young v. Charity Hospitall the issue was
whether appeal rights to the State Civil Service Commission
prescribed thirty days after an employee had been orally noti-
fied by her employing agency that a letter of dismissal had been
mailed to her and a copy of such letter was exhibited to her
even though, due to misaddressing, she never received the orig-
inal letter which was returned to the agency by the post office.2
A majority of the court were unwilling to bring such a pro-
cedure within the constitutional language of a dismissal "ex-
pressed in writing," and consequently were unwilling to ac-
quiesce in the application, by the State Civil Service Commis-
sion, of its Rule 13.2,3 which it construed to cut off the em-
ployee's rights upon the lapse of thirty days from such oral
notification and exhibition of a copy of the letter of dismissal.
Only one member of the court was willing to equate such noti-
fication procedure with the required "expression in writing"
of the Constitution, and therefore to agree that the demand for
a hearing was not timely. The majority of the court not only
agreed that demand made after thirty days had elapsed from
such a notification was timely but also went on to find that the
employee's dismissal had been "without cause" and acquiesced
in a decree on the merits, reinstating the employee in her former
position and ordering that she be paid her back salary.4
Two members of the court, however, were of the opinion
that, even though the demand of the appellant was found to be
timely, the court should, within the mandate of the Constitution,
remand it to the Commission since the Supreme Court has no
* 'Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 708, 77 So.2d 13 (1954).
2. LA. CONST. art XIV, § 15(N) (1) provides: "No person in the State or
Classified Service, having acquired permanent Civil Service Status, shall be de-
moted, dismissed, or discriminated against, except for cause, expressed in writing
by the appointing authority. .. ."
3. LoUISIANA CIVIL SERVICE RULES 48 (1954). Rule 13.2 provides in per-
tinent part: "A person who alleges he has been deprived of his rights or other-
wise been discriminated against. . . may, within 30 days of any such action, de-
mand a hearing .... "
4. 226 La. 708, 716, 77 So.2d 13, 15 (1954).
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original jurisdiction in the matter." It is difficult to see how
under the majority decision the appropriate civil service com-
mission can carry out its constitutional mandate consisting in
"the exclusive right to hear and decide all appeals and the
legality of all removal and disciplinary cases" unless matters
requiring such decision are remanded to it for decision on the
merits after "questions of law" have been finally settled by the
Supreme Court.
The Constitution does not, of course, define in what a de-
cision on the facts consists; it provides only that decisions of
civil service commissions "shall be final on the facts." If this
latter means that review shall be limited to an application of
the substantial evidence rule as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court7 then a commission's determination that there
had been an "expression in writing" of the dismissal would
probably not be disturbed on review since the facts in evidence
were such that either the commission's inference or the con-
trary inference could be drawn by reasonable men. 8 To sup-
port the full substitution of judgment which took place here,
reliance would seem to have to be on the notion that a finding
as to "expression in writing" is a jurisdictional or constitutional
fact finding not subject to the limitations of the substantial
evidence rule.9 Unless resort is had to some such doctrine, a
commission finding as to whether the dismissal was or was not
"with cause," had it been made, would also stand as final, if it
met the substantial evidence rule. However obvious the answer
may be as to such finding, the appropriate commission would
seem entitled to make it rather than the court.10
Rather ironically, on the very day the Young decision was
handed down and rehearing denied, the decision in Konen v.
New Orleans Police Department" was also made. In that case
5. Id. at 720, 77 So.2d at 16.
6. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(0) (1) provides: "There is vested in the State
Civil Service Commission . . . -the exclusive right to hear and decide all appeals
and the legality of all removal and disciplinary cases. The decision of the ap-
propriate Civil Service Commission shall be final on the facts, but an appeal
shall be granted to the Supreme Court of Louisiana on any question of law. .. ."
7. See for example National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consol. Copper
Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
8. For a discussion of the rule as it has developed in the federal cases, see
Comment, 12 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 290, 294 (1952).
9. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932).
10. 226 La. 708, 720, 77 So.2d 13, :17 (1954).
11. 226 La. 739, 77 So.2d 24 (1954).
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the court refused to "interfere with the bona fide judgment of
the Commission" in making a finding that an arrest by a dis-
missed officer was made for unworthy motives, noting in that
connection that "the right of appeal to [the Supreme Court]
is restricted to questions of law alone but is not for that reason
unconstitutional where the prescribed procedure has been fol-
lowed. ' 12 The court quoted approvingly from Corpus Juris
Secundum that "where the decision is based on substantial evi-
dence, the court may not consider the weight or sufficiency of
the evidence."' 1
In Day v. Department of Institutions14 the constitutional pro-
vision requiring a notification expressed in writing of the cause
for which a permanent civil service employee was being "de-
moted, dismissed, or discriminated against"'5 was applied also
to a situation where the question to be determined was whether
there had been a voluntary resignation or a dismissal. As the
court phrased it: "In order to make effective the removal of the
subject employee from the payroll, the fact of the acceptance of
her alleged oral resignation and of her removal from the pay-
roll should have been made known by a statement in writing to
her and to the Director in advance of such action."' 0
In practical effect, this means that in those instances where
a department has accepted an oral resignation without written
acknowledgment, the employee may thereafter, despite the lapse
of the thirty-day period within which demands for hearings
must normally be made, 7 still demand a hearing, since the event
from which the thirty-day period begins to run has not occurred.
The imposed requirement of written notice of acceptance of an
oral resignation has the practical advantage of remedying this
deficiency by supplying a clear starting date for any period of
limitations imposed by the Commission on appeals on the ques-
tion of an alleged voluntary resignation being in fact a dismissal
for cause. This is one of the incidental advantages of the notice
required by the Constitution in the case of an admitted dismissal
for cause in addition to its main function of giving an employee
12. Id. at 748, 77 So.2d at 27.
13. Id. at 750, 77 So.2d at 28.
14. 81 So.2d 826 (La. 1955).
15. LA. CONST. art. Xiv, § 15(N) (1), quoted note 2 supra; Boucher v. Divi-
sion of Employment Security, 226 La. 227, 75 So.2d 343 (1954).
16. 81 So.2d 826, 828 (La. 1955).
17. LOUISIANA CIVIL SERVICE RULES 48, Rule 13.2 (1954).
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a statement of the reasons for his dismissal in the event he
wishes to contest the action. The constitutional provision would
not seem of necessity to require this extension, however, since
it speaks only to the dismissal for cause; it would hardly seem
that "cause" would be set out in a letter acknowledging a resigna-
tion, ostensibly voluntary.' 8
A concurring member of the court noted that on the remand
to the Commission as ordered by the court, only if the Commis-
sion should find that the employee did not voluntarily resign
should the issue of removal without an expression in writing
of the cause be brought into question.19 In the event of such a
finding a statement of the reasons for the dismissal would then
be mandatory on the employing agency and further proceedings
before the Commission would be directed to the validity of such
reasons. While instances presumably will not be numerous where
the voluntariness of an oral resignation will be drawn into ques-
tion, in such instances as do occur assurance of consideration
by the Commission before the facts have grown cold will now
entail prompt written acknowledgment of the resignation by the
employing agency.
BOARD OF PHARMACY
In Louisiana Board of Pharmacy v. Smith,20 the court adopted
the Board's interpretation of its governing statute2' to the effect
that the Board was without discretion to consider an application
for registration on a reciprocity basis until evidence was pre-
sented that the applicant was a graduate of an accredited school
recognized by the Board.22 The applicant in the instant case
was in fact a graduate of a non-accredited correspondence school
of pharmacy, and had been licensed to practice pharmacy in
Massachusetts. The court agreed that only if the applicant's
school was accredited was there then discretion in the Board to
recognize it under the act in effect in 1942. The decree of the
trial court, enjoining the applicant from operating a pharmacy
except with a registered pharmacist on duty, was made final.2 3
18. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(N) (1), quoted note 2 supra.
19. 81 So.2d 826, 829 (La. 1955).
20. 226 La. 537, 76 So.2d 722 (1954).
21. La. Acts 1888, No. 66, § 2, p. 74, as amended; LA. R.S. 37:1179 (1950).
22. 226 La. 537, 547, 76 So.2d 722, 726 (1954).
23. Id. at 551, 76 So.2d at 726.
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